PT Grahaprima Suksesmandiri TbkFull report →1 / 14
GTRAIDXThe short version

PT Grahaprima Suksesmandiri Tbk

PT Grahaprima Suksesmandiri, trading as Graha Trans, is a founder-controlled Indonesian trucking company that grew revenue about 45% a year into a roughly 1,200-truck operator by buying trucks with borrowed money, and now trades near book value after a sharp sell-off.

The visible feed opens near Rp350 in February 2026, peaks at Rp378, slides to a June trough of Rp161, then recovers to Rp242 by late July — about 36% below the February high.
Net debt $32.7M
$0.013
Share price
$39m
FY2025 revenue
80%
Founder ownership
41%
Top-customer share
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IThe business
The business

A founder-run trucking fleet hauling freight across Java and Sumatra

FY2025 revenue by segment
Land Transportation is 89% of revenue; the Karoseri body-building unit is the balance.
  • Full-truck-load trucking. Graha Trans runs about 1,200 trucks from pools around Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Pasuruan, serving FMCG, e-commerce and last-mile logistics customers across Java, Bali and Sumatra.
  • Two segments. Land Transportation — the core hauling business — brought in $35m of FY2025 revenue; the Karoseri unit, which builds truck bodies, added $4m.
  • Closely held, newly listed. Two founders control roughly 80% of the equity, with a 20% public float; the company has traded on the IDX only since March 2023.
Market

A tiny player in a large, fragmented, price-taking freight market

$3.2bn
Indonesian land-freight market
~0.07%
GTRA's share of it
+5.7%
Market growth, per year
A large, growing market that GTRA barely dents.
  • Structural tailwind. Indonesian road freight is a large market growing mid-single digits, pulled along by the FMCG and e-commerce distribution that also drives GTRA's own volume.
  • Price-taker, not price-maker. The market is fragmented and competitive; against listed peer Sidomulyo, whose revenue fell 18.7% in FY2025, GTRA grew 53% — so the gain was share and a big customer, not simply a rising tide.
  • No proprietary moat. Scale, pools and customer ties help, but nothing here is protected; the edge is execution and access to the capital that keeps buying trucks.
IIThe record
Track record

Revenue up about 45% a year, profit nearly ninefold since 2021

Revenue, gross profit, net profit ($M)
Revenue grew every year; FY2025 alone was up 53%.
  • E-commerce did the lifting. The FY2025 jump came mainly from one customer — Shopee's courier arm — whose volume carried the top line past its earlier trajectory, alongside a growing FMCG book.
  • Real, not accounting. The revenue is billed to genuine logistics customers and the fleet backing it expanded in step; net profit rose from $0.5m to $4.2m in four years.
  • Funded by debt. Every truck behind that growth was bought with borrowed money — the engine, and the risk, examined next.
Unit economics

Gross margin fell from 48% to 34%, yet net margin edged up to 11%

Gross margin vs net margin
The two margins diverged sharply in FY2025.
  • The gross line thinned. As GTRA fulfilled more freight with bought-in haulage rather than its own trucks, gross margin dropped eight points in FY2025 alone.
  • Net margin rose anyway. Costs below the gross line — financing and tax as a share of revenue — fell faster still, lifting net margin to 10.6%.
  • A flag, not a verdict. A falling gross margin beside a rising net margin is unusual; whether it holds is one of the report's central questions.
Balance sheet

Operating profit covers the interest bill — but the cash buffer is thin

Operating profit vs finance cost ($M)
Interest cover widened to about 2.4x in FY2025.
  • Self-servicing, for now. FY2025 operating profit of $9.4m covered the $3.9m finance bill about 2.4 times, and operating cash flow of $5.6m cleared it too.
  • Little margin for error. Interest-bearing debt reached $44m against just $1.2m of cash — net debt is about 1.9x equity, so a bad freight year would bite fast.
  • Growth hides on the balance sheet. The 2025 'deleveraging' was an artefact: $14m of new trucks were added off the cash-flow statement via financing, so debt actually rose.
IIIThe story now
What's happening

A fallen star, down about 36% from its February high

The visible feed begins February 2026; closing prices.
  • A sharp sell-off. From the February high the shares more than halved into a June trough, then recovered about half the drop by late July.
  • Cheap on the face of it. At today's price the market values the business at about $25m — roughly 6.6x trailing earnings and 1.2x book, below its own growth rate.
  • No analyst covers it. There is no published consensus or price target; the only forward figure on record is management's own revenue guidance.
Concentration

The growth was single-sourced on both sides — one customer, one affiliate

41%
Revenue from the top customer (Shopee's courier arm)
68%
Of the revenue growth from that one name
38%
Of revenue paid to one affiliated hauler
Both the demand and the capacity behind the near-doubling trace to a single source.
  • GTRA's revenue near-doubling to $39.4m was driven 68% by one customer — Shopee's courier arm Nusantara Ekspres Kilat ($16.1m, 41% of FY2025 revenue) on one-year rolling contracts — while the incremental capacity to serve it was bought largely from commonly-controlled affiliate PT Gama Putra Sukses Prima, to which GTRA paid $14.7m in FY2025, 82.5% of its $17.8m haulage line and 38% of total revenue.
  • The other side. The Shopee arrangement has been renewed repeatedly, and the book already absorbed the loss of a customer worth 13% of FY2023 revenue without a break in revenue.
Durability

The rising net margin leans on a financing cost sitting at a trough

Financing cost as a share of revenue
A full year of interest on new debt reverses the 9.9% trough that flattered FY2025.
  • The finding. GTRA's net margin rose from 9.2% to 10.6% in FY2025 even as gross margin fell 8 points to 34.2% (related-party bought-in haulage reaching $15.0m, 57.8% of cost of revenue) only because financing cost fell to a 9.9%-of-revenue trough,
  • yet $14.4m of new debt-funded fixed assets added late in the year carry ~$1.5-1.7m of annual interest (28-32% of pre-tax profit) and a 10% affiliate-haulage repricing would cost $1.50m (27.5%) — so the offset that holds the margin up is itself about to erode.
  • The other side. Administrative operating leverage is genuine and recurring, so a high-single-digit net margin may prove sustainable rather than a one-year peak.
IVThe price
Valuation

Cheap on earnings, ordinary on enterprise value

How the market prices GTRA
BasisMultiple
Trailing P/E6.6x
Forward P/E (Q1 run-rate)~5.9x
Price / book1.2x
EV / EBIT7.5x
EV / EBITDA5.8x
The equity multiple looks cheaper than the enterprise multiple because of leverage.
  • 6.6x earnings, 1.2x book. On its equity the stock is priced below its own growth rate — the kind of number a value buyer looks for after a sell-off.
  • Leverage closes the gap. Add $42m of net debt and enterprise value is about $70m — an ordinary 7.5x EBIT for a business carrying 1.9x net debt to equity.
  • What the multiple prices in. At about 6x the market is discounting margin compression, customer concentration, thin liquidity and governance opacity — not assuming the growth simply continues.
Scenarios

Small changes in the exit multiple swing the price hard

Share price at different exit P/E multiples
A re-rating to 8-10x on stable earnings implies a much higher price.
  • Downside cushioned. In a bear case — the Shopee line reprices, margin compresses — a 5-6x multiple lands the shares around $0.008-0.011, near the $0.011 book value per share.
  • Base case near here. Steady volume and a net margin near 10% point to about $0.014-0.016, close to today's $0.013.
  • Upside on a re-rating. If concentration and governance fears ease, 8-10x on stable earnings implies $0.018-0.023 — roughly 35-70% above the current price.
Downside

Behind the equity sits a fleet of trucks and land carried at cost

$23m
Book equity (1.2x)
$75m
Total assets, mostly trucks and land
$5.8m
FY2025 truck sales, above book
The asset base backs the debt before the equity.
  • Carried at fair value, not above it. In FY2025 GTRA sold trucks with a $5.8m book value for $5.8m of cash — a small gain, so the fleet is not marked optimistically.
  • Land may be understated. Property sits at historical cost — the one asset line where book could understate value — though the disclosures leave it unquantified.
  • The floor protects lenders first. At 1.9x net debt to equity, that asset base backs the debt before the equity — a real cushion, but not a deep-discount asset play.
What to watch

A cheap founder-owned compounder — or a thin-cash, related-party-dependent fleet one bad freight year from trouble.

Read the full report →

This distills a guided study built chapter by chapter — the business, its record, what is happening now, and what the market asks you to pay.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-08-01 · For information, not investment advice.