Chapter 6

Valuation and Estimates

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

At $0.0133, Graha Trans trades at 6.6x trailing earnings and 1.19x book — statistically cheap for a business that grew net profit 75% in FY2025 and 13% in the first quarter of FY2026. Two facts complicate the screen. No sell-side analyst covers the stock, so there is no forward consensus to anchor to; and the 6.6x equity multiple sits on a thin slice of a balance sheet levered nearly two-to-one, so on enterprise value the same business costs about 7.5x operating profit — an ordinary price, not a distressed one.

The multiples today

Multiples computed at the 31 Jul 2026 close of $0.0133 (Yahoo Finance / IDX) on 1,894,375,000 shares, FY2025 EPS of $0.0022 and equity of $23.2m [1]; FY2025 EBIT and net debt per the consolidated statements [2].

The share count is fixed: 1,894,375,000 shares — the 1,515,500,000 held before the March 2023 IPO plus the 378,875,000 sold to the public [3]. At $0.0133 that is a $25.2m market capitalisation. FY2025 net profit attributable to owners was $4.15m and basic EPS $0.0022 [4], which sets the trailing P/E at 6.6x. Book value per share is $0.0122 against equity of $23.2m attributable to the parent [5], a 1.19x price-to-book.

The dividend is not part of the case. The company paid $0.00011 per share on FY2024 earnings, a total of $0.21m [6] — a payout near 9% of that year's profit and a yield of 0.8% at the current price. No FY2025 dividend has been declared in the corpus. The public float is 20% of the equity, roughly $5.1m of market value, and the stock has no research coverage — a combination that leaves pricing thin and episodic.

Recent trading shows that thinness. The shares reached $0.0208 on 19 February 2026, fell to a $0.0089 low on 8 June — a 57% drawdown — then recovered to $0.0133, still 36% below the February high and well above the $0.0098 IPO price of March 2023 [7].

Source: month-end daily closing prices, Yahoo Finance / IDX (Feb–Jul 2026); intra-period high $0.0208 (19 Feb), low $0.0089 (8 Jun).

The equity multiple flatters the balance sheet

A 6.6x P/E reads as cheap, but earnings accrue to equity that funds only a minority of the assets. Interest-bearing debt at year-end was $43.7m — short-term bank loans, bank term loans, consumer (finance-lease) financing and musyarakah financing — against $1.18m of cash [8]. Adding $42.5m of net debt to the $25.2m market capitalisation gives an enterprise value near $67.7m.

Net debt = $43.7m interest-bearing debt less $1.18m cash [9]; market cap at $0.0133 × 1,894,375,000 shares.

On that enterprise value the multiples are unremarkable. FY2025 operating profit (gross profit of $13.5m less general and administrative expense of $4.1m) was $9.36m [10], putting EV/EBIT at 7.5x. Adding back $2.69m of depreciation [11] gives EBITDA of $12.05m and EV/EBITDA of 5.8x. The gap between the 6.6x P/E and the 7.5x EV/EBIT is the leverage: the equity is a geared claim on the enterprise, which is why a fall in operating profit would hit the share price harder than the headline multiple suggests, and a rise would help it more.

Sources: FY2025 income statement and equity [12]; EPS, share count and dividend [13]; depreciation [14]; Q1 FY2026 profit [15].

Forward estimates: no consensus, one hard data point

The reader's standing request for forward estimates runs into a plain fact: GTRA has no sell-side coverage. Zero analysts publish estimates or price targets; Simply Wall St, stockanalysis.com and Yahoo Finance all show research fields as not available. There is no consensus revenue, EPS or target price to report, and none should be manufactured. What exists is management's own commentary and the most recent quarter.

Management's forward guidance is qualitative and unquantified. The June 2026 Public Expose frames 2026 around continued FMCG and e-commerce demand, operational-efficiency gains in East Java, and geographic expansion into Makassar — with no revenue or profit target attached [16]. Where management has put a number to the future, its record argues for caution in either direction: guidance for FY2025 revenue was around $30m, and the company delivered $39.4m — a 31% overshoot [17]. The Shopee Express ramp that drove that beat (covered in Two Customers) is not a base management had modelled, so its own targets are a weak planning anchor.

The one quantitative forward signal is the first quarter of FY2026, reported in the same deck. Revenue rose 45% year on year, but profit growth was far slower and margins compressed.

Source: Public Expose, 18 Jun 2026, Q1 FY2026 vs Q1 FY2025 [18].

Net profit grew 13% on 45% more revenue because the net margin fell to 10.2% from 13.1% a year earlier, and gross margin slipped to 37.7% from 40.6% [19]. That extends the gross-margin erosion traced in Market and Moat: volume is still compounding, but each dollar of revenue converts to less profit as bought-in haulage capacity carries the growth. Quarterly EPS was $0.00058 [20]. Annualising that at the seasonal weight Q1 carried in FY2025 (about 26% of the full year) points to FY2026 EPS near $0.0023 and net profit near $4.3m — a single-quarter extrapolation, not an estimate, and one that assumes the margin does not slip further. On that run-rate the forward P/E is roughly 5.9x. The next audited print is due 4 August 2026.

What the multiples price in

Holding FY2026 earnings at the Q1 run-rate (~$0.0023 of EPS), the current $0.0133 sits just under 6x forward earnings. The table below shows the price implied by a range of exit multiples against that figure.

Implied price = FY2026e EPS of $0.0023 (annualised Q1 FY2026) × exit multiple; current price $0.0133 (31 Jul 2026, Yahoo Finance / IDX).

At a low-double-digit multiple — ordinary for a growing logistics operator — the shares would roughly double; even holding the multiple flat, growth alone lifts the value. So the depressed rating is doing real work, and it is worth being precise about what it discounts. Four things sit inside the 6x forward multiple, each documented in earlier chapters. Revenue is concentrated in two customers on one-year rolling contracts, one of them 41% of the top line (Two Customers). Margins are compressing as related-party haulage replaces owned-fleet capacity, and the Q1 FY2026 print shows that compression continuing (Market and Moat). The balance sheet carries $43.7m of interest-bearing debt against $0.4m of cash net of a new overdraft, with rollover a live question (Financing the Fleet). And a governance discount attaches to the $14.7m of affiliate purchases and the $1.5m advanced to the parent (Both Sides of the Ledger).

Against those, the value case is not thin. The stock changes hands near book value on a fleet that has recycled through the market at a gain — FY2025 proceeds from disposing of used trucks were $5.83m [21], which argues the $0.0122 of book value understates rather than overstates realisable asset value, and gives the 1.19x price-to-book an asset floor. The owner holds 80% of the equity, so the depressed price is shared by the people who run the company. And the growth is real, not hoped-for: revenue up 45% in the latest quarter, on hard audited numbers.

The read that fits the evidence: GTRA is genuinely cheap on earnings and near an asset floor on book, but the discount is largely explained rather than mispriced — the market is paying under 6x forward earnings for concentration risk, visible margin compression, high leverage and related-party leakage, not overlooking a clean compounder. The strongest fact against that read is the forward arithmetic itself: at ~5.9x forward earnings with revenue still growing 45%, a re-rating needs only for the earnings to hold, not to accelerate. What would resolve it is the direction of margins and the related-party items over the next two prints — if the net margin stabilises around 10% and the parent loan is repaid on schedule in October 2026 rather than rolled or enlarged, the discount looks like neglect; if margins keep sliding and affiliate reliance deepens, it looks earned. How those pieces reconcile into a margin-of-safety view is the work left for the closing chapter.